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6 Abstract Our sense of presence in the real world helps
7 regulate our behaviour within it by telling us about the
8 status and effectiveness of our actions. As such, this ability
9 offers us practical advantages in dealing effectively with
10 the world. It is also an automatic or intuitive response to
11 where and how we find ourselves in that it does not require
12 conscious thought or deliberation. In contrast, the experi-
13 ence of presence or immersion in a movie, game or virtual
14 environment is not automatic but is the product of our
15 deliberate engagement with it, an engagement which first
16 requires a disengagement or decoupling with the real
17 world. Of course, we regularly decouple from the real
18 world and embrace other, possible worlds every time we
19 daydream, or engage in creative problem solving or, most
20 importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, when we
21 make-believe. We propose that make-believe is a plausible
22 psychological mechanism which underpins the experience
23 of mediated presence.
24
25 Keywords Presence ! Pretending ! Make-believe !
26 Engagement ! Immersion
27 1 Introduction
28 Presence, as an academic discipline, dates from the early
29 1990s with the publication of the first journal dedicated to
30 its research. This is not to suggest, however, that designers,
31 artists and writers have been unaware of the power of their
32 media to create a sense of immersion or transportation or
33feelings of being present elsewhere, from long before this
34time. Prehistoric cave art may have been created for this
35very purpose, and the use of stained glass in churches and
36cathedrals has been recognised as a means of transporting
37churchgoers to higher, spiritual dimensions. Indeed stories
38of all kinds, irrespective of medium, have this power to
39transport, immerse, engage and to create a sense of being
40other than where we currently are. The English romantic
41poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge coined the term, ‘‘the will-
42ing suspension of disbelief’’ to describe the apparent
43willingness of readers to engage with stories irrespective of
44their credibility. (Though we are mindful of the earlier and
45more sober observations of the David Hume who wrote of
46imaginative resistance, that is, the reluctance we feel when
47we are invited to embrace something unbelievable.)
48So, before considering what others have defined as
49presence, just what is our central question? It is this, what
50is it that a cave painting, a stained glass window, a poem
51and a myriad of digital technology have in common? A
52tempting answer might lie with inverting Coleridge’s ‘‘the
53willing suspension of disbelief’’ from a double negative to
54the positive statement, ‘‘the willingness to believe’’.
55However, even if we emphasise the temporary nature of
56this belief, belief, in itself, is much too powerful a claim.
57When we watch a (fictional) movie we do not believe what
58we see, nor do we suspend disbelief instead we act (think
59and feel) as though what we are engaged with were the
60case.
61So, returning to the examples we have already consid-
62ered, we do not propose that the people who first gazed on
63cave paintings actually believed themselves to be in the
64presence of aurochs nor, while in churches, to be in the
65company of spiritual beings. Neither do we propose that
66people believe themselves transported to a ‘‘stately plea-
67sure dome’’ after reading Kublai Khan nor fighting aliens
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68 on the surface of Mars with their space marine buddies in a
69 games arcade. What we do propose is that people readily
70 act, think, react and emote as though we were or might be
71 in these situations.
72 This ‘‘as if’’, ‘‘as though’’ and ‘‘might be’’ indirection is
73 one of the key differences between believing and making-
74 believe (and as we shall see, the difference between sanity
75 and psychosis). So rather than believing that we are else-
76 where, we propose that we make-believe that we are.
77 The power of make-believe is not to be underestimated.
78 It is astonishingly ubiquitous and can be found at work in
79 everything from the kind of mundane ‘‘what if’’ thinking
80 we might engage in when deciding what to have for dinner,
81 through to scientific reasoning (e.g. Einstein famously
82 imagined himself chasing a light beam) or competing in the
83 world ‘‘air guitar’’ championships (Guitar 2014). Carru-
84 thers (2011) has also argued that these forms of adult
85 creative expression and childhood pretend play share
86 common cognitive resources/origin; indeed, Vygotski
87 (1978) argued that imagination is ‘‘internalised’’ pretend
88 play. Further, this form of thinking may be a relatively
89 recent evolutionary development which may have first
90 appeared some 50,000 years ago and is responsible for the
91 flowering of human creative thought which has continued
92 ever since then.
93 This paper seeks to make a case for the role of make-
94 believe in the experience of presence. So let us begin by
95 considering the experience of presence.
96 2 Defining presence
97 Early, formal definitions of telepresence, that is, the sense
98 of presence created by technology have included, ‘‘the
99 sense of ‘being there’’’ (e.g. Held and Durlach 1992;
100 Sheridan 1992); and famously as ‘‘the perceptual illusion
101 of non-mediation’’ (Lombard and Ditton 1997) who wrote
102 that, ‘‘An illusion of non-mediation occurs when a person
103 fails to perceive or acknowledge the existence of a medium
104 in his/her communication environment and responds as he/
105 she would if the medium were not there’’. This description
106 is highly reminiscent of both Norman’s (1999) disap-
107 pearing computer design proposal and Heidegger’s obser-
108 vation that when we are absorbed in activities such as
109 hammering, the hammer and the nails disappear and only
110 the hammering remains (Heidegger 1927).
111 Presence has also been described as, ‘‘A mental state in
112 which a user feels physically present within the computer-
113 mediated environment’’ (Draper et al. 1998) and ‘‘the
114 subjective experience of being in one place or environ-
115 ment, even when one is physically situated in another’’
116 (e.g. Witmer and Singer 1998). Further and following
117 Coleridge, Slater et al. (1994) have described presence as
118‘‘the (suspension of dis-) belief’’ of being located in a
119world other than the physical one’’. As Riva (2009) notes,
120these accounts explicitly define presence as a consequence
121of using or interacting with the technology. This assump-
122tion, explicit or otherwise, also serves to define real world
123presence as the standard against which instances of this
124technologically mediated presence (mediated presence
125hereafter) can be compared.
1262.1 Theoretically rich accounts of presence
127More recently, these early definitions have been challenged
128by more sophisticated and theoretically rich treatments.
129These are, of course, correspondingly much longer and
130more detailed than the initial, rather snappy, one line def-
131initions. For this reason, we will focus on only one of these
132and here the work of Riva and Waterworth is an obvious
133choice as it offers a particularly detailed and complex
134account. They began by posing the question ‘‘What is the
135purpose of presence?’’ and have systematically answered it
136from a series of evolutionary-psychological, neuro-psy-
137chological and cognitive scientific perspectives. They
138argue that presence either evolved for no particular purpose
139(that is, as an emergent or serendipitous property of the
140nervous system) or it must offer evolutionary advantage. In
141examining the latter alternative, they note that ‘‘the
142appearance of the sense of presence allows the nervous
143system to solve a key problem for its survival: how to
144differentiate between internal and external states’’ (Riva
145et al. 2004).
146From there, they have drawn upon neuropsychology to
147propose a mapping between the different forms of self or
148‘‘layers’’ of consciousness which Damaiso’s work has
149uncovered and corresponding forms of presence (Damasio
1501999). They have successively paired proto-presence, core-
151presence and extended presence onto the proto-self, core-
152self and extended self. With each step up this phylogenetic
153‘‘ladder’’, the experience of presence becomes richer, more
154detailed and more recognisable. From here, they recognise
155that the experience of presence is intuitive, that is, the
156product of unconscious and largely automatic cognitive
157processes. Thus, we do not make a conscious decision to be
158present in the world but find ourselves here as an imme-
159diate cognitive response. In recognising presence as an
160intuitive process, they also locate it within the dual-process
161accounts of cognition. These dual-process accounts com-
162prise a broad family of theories which, while disagreeing in
163detail, do recognise that there are two basic forms of
164thinking, one is fast and intuitive (usually described as type
165or system 1 thinking) while the other is slow and deliberate
166(system 2 thinking). (We return to this point in Sect. 4).
167Most recently, they have added the dimension of embodi-
168ment into their account which seamlessly affords the
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169 integration of tools into the body schemata. The inclusion
170 of activity theory also allows us to consider presence from
171 the perspective of (human) objectives and goals (e.g. Riva
172 2009; Riva et al. 2009; Riva and Waterworth 2014).
173 In all, Riva and his colleagues have a comprehensive
174 and coherent account of real world presence. Their work
175 has located real world presence in a plausible evolutionary
176 context and mapped expression of presence to different
177 layers (self) of consciousness. This is a singular achieve-
178 ment. Other approaches have their own strengths and
179 weaknesses but this work provides a flavour and overview
180 of contemporary thinking in the presence of research. So
181 far we have only really considered real world presence, but
182 what of the technologically mediated variety?
183 2.2 A make-believe account of presence
184 We are present in the real world but we also frequently
185 decide to immerse ourselves and to feel present in
186 media. We will argue that the means by which we feel
187 present in these other ‘‘worlds’’ lies with our ability to
188 make-believe. When we pretend (particularly as chil-
189 dren), we make-believe or imagine we enter alternate
190 worlds. These worlds may be not as vivid, immediate or
191 as tangible as the real world, but they can be very
192 engaging. These worlds are often solely the product of
193 these abilities but very often they are directed and
194 shaped by external media and artefacts such as toys,
195 stories, other people and, of course, digital technology
196 (Walton 1990).
197 These episodes of mediated presence/make-believe are a
198 consequence of cognitive decoupling and are ‘‘sandbox-
199 ed’’—or equivalent, in that they are labelled as make-
200 believe. When we stop pretending we return to the real
201 world. (Before we develop this argument further, we should
202 emphasise that we not are suggesting that pretending is in
203 any sense concerned with deception or the wilful duping of
204 innocent researchers).
205 Let us consider the following two scenarios. The first of
206 these is set in a children’s tea party while the second
207 considers the exploration of a virtual recreation of central
208 London. In the first instance:
209 A child proposes that she and her friends might hold a
210 tea party. They agree to participate and equip them-
211 selves with toy tea cups and a toy teapot. The teapot
212 is filled with water in lieu of tea. The children lay the
213 tea set neatly on a tablecloth. One child acting as
214 ‘‘mother’’ (the tea pourer) pours everyone a cup of
215 ‘‘tea’’. As each child drinks from their cup of ‘‘tea’’,
216 they may then chat and perhaps share pretend
217 ‘‘cake’’. As the ‘‘tea’’ is drunk, ‘‘mother’’ refills the
218 empty cups. The party reaches its natural conclusion.
219For the duration of the tea party, the group of children
220have made-believe that water is tea, and they have behaved
221as if they were adults by imitating how they have seen their
222parents behave at a real tea party. Cups have been drunk
223from emptied and refilled. Conversations were enjoyed,
224and ‘‘cake’’ may have been consumed. Having behaved as
225if they were at a tea party, the children disperse.
226In the second instance:
227A potential tourist using an immersive re-creation of
228London to get a sense of the city before booking a trip
229there. The tourist, in the immersive suite of the travel
230agent’s premises, puts on a lightweight head-mounted
231display and a set of headphones and instantly finds
232themselves standing at the heart of Trafalgar Square.
233Looking around them they see pigeons completing a
234circuit around Nelson’s Column before they head
235down Whitehall towards the river. The potential
236tourist is a little disappointed to find that it is not
237raining in London but is convinced enough that they
238want to go there in person.
239For the duration of their trip to London, this tourist has
240made-believe that he has engaged with a faithful repre-
241sentation of the city. They have made-believed what they
242have seen and, within the constraints of the technology,
243they have acted as through they were there.
244While there are enormous differences between toy tea-
245cups and water in the first scenario and a head-mounted
246display and a virtual model of London, there are also
247striking parallels too. In both instances, the ‘‘players’’
248decoupled the real world in favour of a make-believe
249world. They act as they were engaged in a tea party and as
250though they were in Trafalgar Square. While make-believe
251(or its synonyms) may not be the only psychological
252mechanism involved in mediated presence it is nonetheless
253central to its experience.
2543 The anatomy of make-believe
255We all pretend. We develop this ability early in life and
256subsequently exercise it along with making-believe and
257imagining. These activities are probably at their most
258compelling when they are exercised in conjunction with
259external artefacts such as toys, books and works of art or
260more recently with digital technology.
261Pretending is important to the social and cognitive
262development of children through its expression as (pretend)
263play. Russ (2004), for example, has argued that the
264development of a number of cognitive and affective pro-
265cesses rely on pretend play. Pretend play involves the
266exercise of divergent and convergent thinking, and it also
267facilitates the expression of both positive and negative
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268 feelings, and the ability to integrate emotion with cognition
269 (e.g. Jent et al. 2011; Seja and Russ 1999). Early pretend
270 play has also been implicated in creativity in later life
271 (Russ 2004; Singer and Singer 2005). Significantly, Garvey
272 (1990) tell us that pretend play is the ‘‘voluntary transfor-
273 mation of the here and now, the you and me, and the this or
274 that, along with any potential action that these components
275 of a situation might have’’.
276 Pretending is purposive, and Rakoczy et al. (2004) have
277 reported that children as young as two are able to appre-
278 ciate the difference between trying to perform an action in
279 the real world, and pretending to perform the same action.
280 This ability is essential; otherwise, we would be unable to
281 discriminate pretending from any other form of action.
282 Examples of pretending are myriad but citing children’s tea
283 party remains a firm favourite.
284 So, returning to the tea party in a little more detail: once
285 embarked on this pretend play, the individual child makes
286 attributions such as, ‘‘I am drinking tea with my friends’’
287 and this is one of many instance which are not the case.
288 Further, her friends are making similar attributions of
289 themselves and they are also each attributing the mental
290 state of ‘‘we are having a tea party’’ to each other. We note
291 that these mechanisms (and attributions) are examples of
292 social intentionality in action which is a necessary condi-
293 tion for social presence.
294 Adult pretending is little different. Some of us are all too
295 readily transported to the battles fought in Middle Earth
296 (Green 2005) or are happy to pretend that we can fly to
297 other planets and speak to the aliens we find there. Just as
298 the tea was not real, nor is Middle Earth and faster than
299 light travel is even less likely than being able to speak to
300 aliens. Nonetheless, we readily make-believe these things,
301 which are not the case, at least for duration of our pretence,
302 TV episode or scientific discussion.
303 Thus, pretending is the ability to engage in what if
304 thinking and as a consequence and, in short, the ability to
305 run mental simulations. Pretending as what if thinking is
306 evidenced in domains as diverse as design thinking (e.g.
307 Buchanan 1992), scientific reasoning (e.g. Toon 2010),
308 acting on stage (Goldstein and Bloom 2011) and our pro-
309 pensity to anthropomorphise technology (e.g. Fogg and
310 Nass 1997).
311 Finally, from an evolutionary psychology perspective,
312 Cosmides and Tooby (2000) tell us that being able to
313 pretend is the result of cognitive de-coupling which they
314 define as our ability to make use of contingent information
315 and the artefacts which embody that information. They
316 write, ‘‘arguably, one central and distinguishing innovation
317 in human evolution has been the dramatic increase in the
318 use of contingent information for the regulation of impro-
319 vised behaviour’’ (p. 53). Thus, we pretend when presented
320 with media such diverse as cave art to the latest Imax
321movie and in doing so temporarily divorce ourselves from
322the everyday and mundane.
3233.1 The curious nature of pretend play
324The existing research into our ability to pretend has been
325largely confined to the study of pretend play in young
326children. Indeed, Nichols and Stitch (2005, p. 20) have
327commented on the paucity of research into adult pretend-
328ing. However, from their own work, they conclude that
329adult and childhood pretending is not very different. While
330this judgement may be a little broad, there is no extant
331evidence to the contrary.
332It should be noted that the primary focus of these studies
333has tended to be the nature and dynamics of pretend play
334and its role in the cognitive or social development of the
335child. However, children’s ability to pretend per se has also
336received attention.
337Pretending (and pretend play) presents a number of
338intriguing, if not downright astonishing, problems for the
339researcher as identified by Leslie (1987, p. 412), ‘‘Pre-
340tending ought to strike the cognitive psychologist as a very
341odd sort of ability. After all, from an evolutionary point of
342view, there ought to be a high premium on the veridicality
343of cognitive processes. The perceiving, thinking organism
344ought, as far as possible, to get things right. Yet pretence
345flies in the face of this fundamental principle. In pretence,
346we deliberately distort reality’’. In essence, we can pretend
347before we have formed a veridical view of the world. He
348continues with the observation that our ability to pretend
349should, more reasonably, arise at the end of our intellectual
350development rather than ‘‘at the very beginning of child-
351hood’’. Most recently, Nakayama (2013) has presented
352evidence of children as young as 7 months old pretending
353to cry merely as a means of obtaining ‘‘caregiver physical
354contact’’. There is widely accepted evidence that children
355are able to engage in pretending soon after their first
356birthday, and this is years earlier than any suggestion of a
357fully developed cognition. Having achieved cognitive
358mastery of the world, one might expect an individual to be
359able to demonstrate this ability by deliberately distorting
360the representation and then returning to it skilfully, but not
361before complete competence had been acquired. Finally, in
362a form of language which is reminiscent of computer sci-
363ence, Leslie poses the following questions just how is it
364possible for a child to think about a banana as though it
365were a telephone? His point is, if the representational
366system, which cognitivists claim to underpin cognition, is
367still in the process of ‘‘mapping’’ the world, how does it
368manage to tolerate distortions such as this? How is it that
369our cognition does not ‘‘crash’’ given this arbitrary
370onslaught? While his own solution to this problem is to
371propose a meta-representational account of pretence (about
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372 which we have more to say in Sect. 4.2), Harris (2000) has
373 challenged his reasoning.
374 3.2 Imagining
375 If children pretend, then adults imagine. Vygotski (1978)
376 writes that ‘‘Imagination is a new formation that is not
377 present in the consciousness of the very raw young child is
378 totally absent in animals and represents a specifically
379 human form of conscious activity.’’ We have already noted
380 that imagination is ‘‘internalised’’ pretending or is ‘‘pre-
381 tending without the physical actions’’.
382 We have adopted a fairly pragmatic perspective because
383 imagination and imagination have proved to be highly
384 resistant to definition. One of the problems with defining,
385 much less understanding, imagination is that it might rea-
386 sonably be applied to such activities as day-dreaming,
387 fantasising, visualising, wishing (and, of course, pretending
388 and making-believe) and a whole host of other slippery
389 concepts. Further, the word itself also suggests the
390 involvement of visual imagery which may or may not exist
391 as a definitive and distinct mode of representation (e.g.
392 Pylyshyn 1973, 1981).
393 However, Harris (2000) describes imagination as the
394 capacity to consider alternative possibilities and their
395 implication. He also tells us that this emerges early and
396 transforms children’s developing conception of reality. We
397 note that his position is quite similar to that explored in this
398 paper but our terminology is different, and his work is
399 primarily focussed on child development. Helpfully, he
400 identifies three roles for imagination (p. 161): (1) to
401 become ‘‘absorbed in make-believe or fictional worlds’’;
402 (2) to make ‘‘comparisons between actual outcomes and
403 various outcomes’’; and (3) to explore the ‘‘impossible and
404 magical’’. This reference to absorption in make-believe
405 worlds points clearly at a role for imagination in the
406 exploration of the magical worlds of digital media.
407 3.3 Make-believe
408 So far we have adopted a simple approach to key defini-
409 tions. Pretending is child’s play, and imagination is inter-
410 nalised pretending. What of the operation of make-believe?
411 Here, we follow Walton (1990) and implicate the external
412 world in make-believe.
413 We propose that pretending and imagining must share
414 core cognitive resources—one being the ‘‘adult’’ version of
415 the other and we can also reasonably say that both reflect
416 our embodiment. Vygotski (1978) (again) telling us, ‘‘Like
417 all functions of consciousness, [imagination] originally
418 arises from action’’. However, both pretending and imag-
419 ining routinely make use of external artefacts. Walton
420 (1993) writes ‘‘Dolls and hobby horses are valuable for
421their contribution to make-believe. The same I true for
422paintings and novels. These and other propos stimulate our
423imagination and provide for exciting or pleasurable or
424interesting engagements with fictional worlds. A doll, in
425itself just a bundle of rags or moulded plastic, comes alive
426in a game of make-believe, providing the participant with
427(fictional) baby’’. Walton calls this ‘‘prop oriented make-
428believe’’ which he contrasts with ‘‘content-oriented make-
429believe’’.
430Make-believe, in the context of the current discussion, is
431of this form though ‘‘affordance oriented make-believe’’
432may be a more cogent description.
4334 Make-believe as cognition
434It is now well established in both the philosophical and
435psychological literature that there are two kinds of think-
436ing, one fast and intuitive and the other slow and deliber-
437ative (e.g. Epstein 1994; Hammond 1996; Sloman 1996;
438Evans and B. T. 2003; amonst many others). Further, this
439distinction has not been confined to theoretical consider-
440ation alone as these two forms of cognition have been
441researched in domains as diverse as judgment and decision
442making (Kahneman 2002; Kahneman 2011); learning
443(Dienes and Perner 1999; Reber 1993), social cognition
444(e.g. Chaiken and Trope 1999; Epstein 1994) and enaction.
445For example, Hutto and Myin (2013), from a radical en-
446active viewpoint, distinguish between ‘‘basic minds’’ and
447‘‘enculturated, scaffolded’’ minds. The former is responsi-
448ble for the ‘‘vast sea of what humans do and experience’’
449while our encultured minds are capable of language, more
450speculative thinking and planning.
451And because of the huge diversity of terms used to
452describe these two forms of thinking, it has become
453something of a convention to designate them system 1 or
454system 2 thinking.
455System 1 is the form of cognition common to both
456humans and other animals. As we have already noted that
457its operation is fast and intuitive and is responsible to our
458day-to-day coping with the world. System 1 thinking has a
459long list of attributes associated with it including being
460high capacity, associative, contextualised and not con-
461scious. Kahneman (2011) adds to this list ‘‘able to complete
462the phrase, ‘bread and …’’’, being able to answer the
463question, ‘‘2 ? 2=’’ and being able to read and understand
464simple sentences. In reality is probably not a single system,
465but may comprise to be a set of autonomous sub-systems
466(e.g. Stanovich and West 2003; Stanovich 2004).
467Dual-process theorists claim that human beings evolved
468a powerful general purpose reasoning system—system 2—
469which coexists with our older system 1 abilities. Unlike
470system 1, system 2 is slow, has limited capacity and is
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471 conscious. System 2 thinking is also uniquely human and
472 may have evolved quite recently—perhaps within the past
473 50,000 years. System 2 thinking is sequential and has a
474 relatively limited capacity; it is also slower than system 1
475 thinking. However, system 2 permits a number of opera-
476 tions which are not available to system 1 thinking. These
477 include abstract hypothetical thinking and make-believe.
478 4.1 System 2 thinking and the origins of culture?
479 From an anthropological perspective and as we have
480 already noted, Mithen (2002) has argued that there is
481 (indirect) evidence of the appearance of system 2 thinking
482 in relatively recent times writing, ‘‘… modern humans had
483 a cognitive advantage which may have resided in a more
484 complex form of language or a quite different type of
485 mentality… Support for the latter is readily evident in from
486 dramatic developments that occur in the archaeological
487 record relating to new ways of thinking and behaving by
488 modern humans.’’ (p. 33). He also comments on the sudden
489 change in the archaeological record c. 50,000 years ago
490 with the appearance of representational art, religious
491 imagery and rapid adaptations in the design of tools and
492 artefacts.
493 Tattersall (2006, pp. 67–68) also notes that ‘‘When the
494 first Cro-Magnons arrived in Europe some 40,000 years
495 ago, they evidently brought with them more or less the
496 entire panoply of behaviours that distinguishes modern
497 humans from every other species that has ever existed.
498 Sculpture, engraving, painting, body ornamentation, music,
499 notation, subtle understanding of diverse materials, elabo-
500 rate burial of the dead and painstaking decoration of util-
501 itarian objects—all these and more were an integral part of
502 the day-to-day experience of early Homo sapiens …’’.
503 While Calvin (2006 p. 85) observes that ‘‘… intelligence
504 arose primarily through the refinement of some brain spe-
505 cialisation… The specialisation would allow a quantum
506 leap in cleverness and foresight during the evolution of
507 humans from apes– perhaps the creative explosion seen
508 about 50,000 years ago, when people who looked like us
509 […] finally began acting like us.’’ Although there is some
510 debate about the timing of this ‘‘overnight flowering’’, it is
511 generally agreed that modern humans are capable of
512 (Lewis-Williams 2004, p. 97): abstract thinking; the ability
513 to act with reference to abstract concepts; planning depth;
514 the ability to formulate strategies […] and to act upon them
515 in a group context; behavioural, economic and technolog-
516 ical innovation; and symbolic behaviour, the ability to
517 represent objects, people and abstract concepts with arbi-
518 trary symbols. These are some of the many behaviours
519 which distinguish modern man from our ancestors. It is
520 plausible to believe that the development of system 2
521 thinking is the source of these abilities to think
522imaginatively, to engage in what ‘‘if thinking’’ and to
523engage in make-believe.
524Given that we are able to engage in two distinct forms of
525thinking, we must inevitably be able to switch between
526them. In practice, this means decoupling from the pre-
527dominant system 1 thinking which is busy allowing us to
528cope with the everyday demands of the world and engaging
529with the slower, deeper and more imaginative system 2
530thinking.
5314.2 Cognitive decoupling
532We regularly witness cognitive decoupling when our minds
533wander or when we actively imagine, make-believe or
534pretend; however, there is also a substantial body of work
535on cognitive decoupling which to be found in the devel-
536opmental psychology corpus and which we now consider.
5374.2.1 Metacognition
538Leslie (1987) begins by supposing that the child is able to
539create a representation of the world which is accurate and
540faithful. This he calls the primary representation, and this
541has a direct semantic relation with the world. For pre-
542tending to occur, the child must make a copy of this rep-
543resentation and change it. This copy is decoupled from the
544world being a copy of a copy- a meta-representation, and it
545is this which forms the basis of our ability to pretend. He
546goes on to propose a semantics of pretence. Of course,
547children need to be able to distinguish between acting and
548believing in the real world and pretending and this is
549achieved by quarantining the meta-representation from the
550real copy (of the world). The key to Leslie’s account is the
551de-coupler which has three main components—perceptual
552processes, cognitive systems and the de-coupler itself. The
553de-coupler in turn comprises further elements, which are
554responsible for making a copy of the primary representa-
555tion and its subsequent manipulation and quarantining. It
556should be noted that this model relies upon the supposition
557of a common representational code governing the whole
558process (cf. Prinz 1984).
5594.2.2 Possible world boxes
560Nichols and Stitch (2005) have created an influential cog-
561nitive model of pretending which itself is based on a
562modification to what they describe as the ‘‘widely accepted
563account of cognition as adopted by people working in this
564field’’. Nichols and Stitch make it clear that they do not
565believe that their account is necessarily complete or
566definitive but that they do think that they have, in contrast
567to other researchers, described pretending quite fully. Their
568most frequent criticism of other accounts being that they
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569 are ‘‘under-described’’. They begin by noting that the mind
570 (sic) contains two quite different kinds of representational
571 states, namely, beliefs and desires. Beliefs are what we
572 know, true and false, about the world. Desires are what we
573 want, and Nichols and Stitch implicate the bodily systems
574 of being the source of them.
575 To pretend is to create another ‘‘world’’ in the possible
576 world box (partition) of our cognition. They tell us that
577 pretending begins with a premise (‘‘let’s have a tea party’’)
578 which, if adopted by the pretender, forms the basis for sub-
579 sequent inference and embellishment. They also recognise
580 that the premise may be bound or constrained by schematic
581 structures, writing: ‘‘clusters or packets of representations
582 whose contents constitute ‘scripts’ or paradigms detailing
583 the way in which certain situations typically unfold’’ (p. 34).
584 The contents of the possibleworld box have full access to our
585 beliefs and from there to our practical reasoning faculties. An
586 updater mechanism keeps us informed as to the status of the
587 pretend episode. The possible world box is populated with
588 representational tokens which are different from those found
589 in the beliefs and desires boxes. These tokens neither rep-
590 resent the world as it is, nor what we would like it to be, but
591 rather represent what the world ‘‘would be like given some
592 set of assumptions that we neither believe to be true (that is,
593 we believe to be the case) or want to be true’’(Nichols and
594 Stitch, ibid p. 29). The precise nature of the possible world
595 box in their account is, unhappily, a little under-described.
596 4.2.3 Twin Earth
597 Finally, Lillard (2001) rejects the meta-representation
598 account of pretending and offers the ‘‘Twin Earth’’ model
599 in its place. The ‘‘Twin Earth’’ model has its origins with
600 Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment.1 Lillard writes
601 that pretend play for children is similar to this Twin Earth
602 thought experiment. She tells us that when children pre-
603 tend, they create another world that shares many of the
604 characteristics of the real world. While much remains the
605 same, there are, of course, significant changes, such as the
606 ‘‘child becomes the mother [and]… sand becomes apple
607 pie’’, (ibid, p. 22). Then, the child reasons about the con-
608 stituent parts of this twin world. Many of the relationships
609 are unchanged, for example, while the child may pretend to
610 be the mother; this (twin) mother treats her children just
611 like the real world version. Lillard notes that both pretend
612 play and Twin Earth are quarantined worlds which are
613 decoupled from the real world.
614Although these three models are quite different in detail
615they appear to be logically very similar. By whatever
616means we are able to separate ourselves from the real
617world, and interact with, reason and emote about another.
6185 Discussion
619As film goers we agree to make-believe—at least for the
6202 h of the movie—that James Bond does not appear to
621age or suffer from liver disease after several lifetimes of
622heavy drinking. This is not the suspension of disbelief.
623No one goes to the cinema muttering under their breath,
624‘‘I know this is not real but I will suspend this disbelief
625for the moment’’, instead we readily make-believe
626despite knowing that what we are about to experience is
627not the case. The movie (game or virtual environment) is
628brought to life and is made real or real enough, by our
629ability to make-believe. Making-believe is a form of
630cognition which is decoupled from the real world and
631which enables us to explore and engage with fictional or
632imaginary worlds. If make-believe opens the door to
633other worlds, then the sense of mediated presence keeps it
634open.
635This paper has presented a new account of presence
636which is based on make-believe. It has also proposed that
637make-believe is a form of system 2 thinking which serves
638to complement real world presence. We have also argued
639that the sudden appearance of artistic expression some
64040,000–50,000 years ago may have coincided with the
641development of our ability to make-believe.
642Having made a case for make-believe, just what does
643this tell us about the experience of presence?
6445.1 What make-believe tells us about presence
645Numerous researchers have observed that pretend play
646shares a pair of features that have labelled mirroring and
647quarantining. Indeed, we have already made oblique ref-
648erence to quarantining already.
649When children pretend, they tend to follow a number of
650‘‘rules’’ which are analogues of real world thought and
651behaviour, and this behaviour been described as mirroring.
652Further, it has also been observed that pretend behaviour is
653restricted to the bounds of the pretend episode. With a few
654exceptions, our pretend behaviour is said to be quarantined
655and does not extend into the real world.
656Finally, although mirroring and quarantining govern the
657behaviour of the pretender, there is also evidence of what
658we shall describe as ‘‘affective-bleed’’, or contagion, by
659which emotional states evoked in make-believe worlds can
660transfer to the real world.
661We will now consider each of these in turn.
1FL01 1 Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment asks us to believe
1FL02 (pretend) that elsewhere in the universe there is a planet exactly like
1FL03 Earth in virtually all respects, refer to as ‘‘Twin Earth’’. Having said
1FL04 ‘‘virtually all respects’’, Putnam goes on to propose some differences
1FL05 between the two for the purpose of philosophical discourse and
1FL06 exploring the nature of semantics.
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662 5.1.1 Mirroring and quarantining
663 What is pretended (i.e. the contents of a pretend episode
664 and the behaviour of those pretending) has been found to
665 be governed by the same kinds of laws and restriction that
666 we encounter in the real world. Reality may be suspended,
667 but not wholly. Make-believe mirrors the real world. We
668 still expect to hold a make-believe weapon such as a light
669 sabre in our hands, and we are more likely sitting on the
670 ruby throne rather than eat lunch off it. These ‘‘rules’’ make
671 our pretending believable and when they are broken as in a
672 movie ‘‘plot hole’’ the make-believe becomes unbelievable.
673 Let us consider a tea party again. Leslie (1994) found
674 that when he ‘‘tipped out’’ and ‘‘spilled’’ the contents of
675 one of the (empty) teacups, the children regarded this cup
676 to be ‘‘empty’’ while non-tipped cups continued to be
677 ‘‘full’’. The basic laws of physics continue to hold. Walton
678 (1990) has made similar observations in that make-believe
679 games, cinema, and a variety of other media are governed
680 by what he describes as ‘‘principles of generation’’ which
681 are ‘‘reality-oriented’’. This reality principle is based on
682 similarities to the real world.
683 He also proposes the Mutual Belief Principle for fan-
684 tastic worlds (the Star TrekTM or Star WarsTM worlds). The
685 principle is based on a tacit agreement between the creator
686 of these worlds (and a set of rules which hold for these
687 fantastic places) and those who experience them. In these
688 worlds, for example, it is ‘‘agreed’’ that alien languages are
689 mutually intelligible.
690 Quarantining complements mirroring in that the events
691 which occurred within the make-believe episode are con-
692 fined to them. Spilling make-believe ‘‘tea’’ will not result
693 in clothing really being wet. Perhaps, the most interesting
694 aspect of quarantining is when it fails. The failure to
695 quarantine make-believe attitudes, beliefs and behaviours
696 may be taken to be a symptom of mental illness. This is
697 evidenced in the all too frequent reports of murderous
698 gunmen attributing their behaviour to having played vio-
699 lent games.
700 Thus, the study of make-believe has a good deal to say
701 about the believability of the experiences offered by digital
702 technology (please see Turner et al. (in press) for a detailed
703 discussion of this), and in turn may afford an explanation of
704 many instances when presence breaks down—where, for
705 example, fictional premises become too far removed from
706 the real world or technologies operate in a manner which is
707 internally inconsistent.
708 5.1.2 Contagion and affective bleed
709 Although make-believe is largely governed by mirroring
710 and quarantining, both may be violated. Quarantining
711 breaks down and becomes ‘‘contagion’’ when the contents
712of the pretence directly affect actual attitudes and behav-
713iour. This is most readily witnessed when these attitudes
714and behaviour are predominately affective, for example,
715imagining something scary (for example, as a fierce animal
716in the kitchen) may ‘‘bleed’’ and give rise to actual hesi-
717tation such as reluctance to enter the room.
718In attempting to explain thus Gendler (2008) has pro-
719posed a new form of believe—the alief which is ‘‘asso-
720ciative, action-generating, affect-laden, arational,
721automatic, agnostic with respect to its content, shared with
722animals, and developmentally and conceptually antecedent
723to other cognitive attitudes’’ (the leading italicised ‘‘a’s’’
724are hers). An alief is also defined as an habitual propensity
725to respond automatically and affective to particular stimuli.
726So, for example, Gendler also tells us that while a subject
727may believe that drinking out of a sterile bedpan is com-
728pletely safe, she may nonetheless show hesitation and
729disgust at the prospect of doing so because the bedpan
730invokes an alief with the content ‘‘filthy object, disgusting,
731stay away’’. By way of further example, Gendler describes
732the effect produced by walking on the glass-floored Grand
733Canyon Skywalk as an alief incorporating ‘‘the visual
734appearance as of a cliff, the feeling of fear and the motor
735routine of retreat’’ (2011). This, of course, immediately
736recalls Slater’s experiments with the (virtual) visual cliff
737(1994) and offers an alternative explanation of his findings.
738In these experiments, participants were found to hesitate
739when faced with a virtual ‘‘pit’’. The relevance of conta-
740gion to presence research may also some way in explaining
741the successful use of virtual reality in the treatment of
742phobias (e.g. Rothbaum et al. 1995, 1996; Botella et al.
7431998; Emmelkamp et al. 2002). In these instances, virtual
744re-creations of spiders, flying, confined spaces and so forth
745have been used to systematically de-sensitise those suf-
746fering from the corresponding phobias by presenting them
747with the object of their fear in a safe, managed environment
748but one which is capable of evoking an affective response.
749Perhaps, even more dramatically, Hoffman et al. (2006)
750have reported the successful use of virtual reality tech-
751nology in the pain management of burns treatment. In their
752study, they reported that the feeling of cold (induced by a
753snowy landscape) can be used to reduce the pain from real
754world burns suffered by servicemen.
755Clearly, at least part of the explanation of the usefulness
756of virtual reality in treatment and therapy may lie with the
757contagion aspect of make-believe.
7585.2 Further work
759There are (at least) two areas of further work which
760immediately present themselves: the first is the role of
761technology in make-believe; the second concerns social
762intentionality and social presence.
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763 To date, developmental psychologists have treated pre-
764 tending and make-believe as embedded cognitive processes,
765 that is, confined to the brain. However, there is clearly a case
766 for artefacts as an essential part inmaking-believe and to date
767 this has largely been limited to Walton’s remarks as to the
768 role of the external as prop.One route to elucidating their role
769 in make-believe, and in turn, presence, would be to adopt an
770 external cognition perspective following Clark and Chal-
771 mers (1998) or to adopt a more radical, enactive affordance
772 only route (cf. Hutto and Myin 2013).
773 There is a broad consensus that being able to anticipate
774 the behaviour and intentions of others is a necessary con-
775 dition for social relations to exist. This ability is more
776 usually known as ‘‘theory of mind’’ a term coined by
777 Premack and Woodruff (1978). We need a theory of mind
778 to communicate and cooperate with each other and without
779 it there can be no sense of social presence, the use of
780 technology to create the experience of being with other
781 people (e.g. Biocca et al. 2003 and many others). This is a
782 very broad area of research ranging from the study of the
783 use of video and text conferencing to the characteristics of
784 social networking sites and the effectiveness of avatars on
785 web sites. Biocca and his colleagues (ibid, 456–457) define
786 social presence as the ‘‘sense of being with another’’ where
787 this other can be either a human or artificial intelligence.
788 The others to which he refers include representations of
789 other humans presented by way of text, images, moving
790 images, avatars and so forth. Predicated on all of these
791 approaches to ‘‘social interaction’’ is the need for the
792 ability for one individual to understand the intentions,
793 motivation and behaviour of others.
794 There is a wide body of research which has demon-
795 strated clear links between pretend play and a theory of
796 mind. Pretend play requires the child to able to coordinate
797 multiple perspectives i.e. to hold two realities about the
798 same thing in her mind. Further, when a child sees another
799 engaged in this same kind of pretending, she must under-
800 stand (or at least have a theory about) what is going on in
801 her mind in order to understand the other’s pretending.
802 Social presence, social intentionality and theory of mind
803 are intimately linked to our ability to make-believe.
804 Acknowledgments Thanks to my reviewers for their perceptive and
805 detailed comments.
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